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Abstract
We apply the Business Cycle Accounting methodology developed by Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2007) to study the economic resurgence of Brazil,
Russia, India and China (BRIC) over the last decade. We document that while
e¢ ciency wedges do contribute in a large part to growth, especially in Brazil
and Russia, there is an increasing importance of investment wedges especially
in the late 2000s, noted in China and India. The results are typically related to
the stages of development with Brazil and Russia coming o¤ a crisis to grow in
the 2000s, while India and China were on a comparatively stable growth path.
Relating wedge patterns to institutional and nancial reforms, we nd that
nancial market developments and e¤ective governance in BRICs in the last
decade are consistent with improvements in investment and e¢ ciency wedges
that led to growth.
Keywords: BRIC, business cycle accounting, e¢ ciency, market frictions,
trend shocks, investment adjustment costs
JEL Codes: E32, E66
At its simplest, a growth economy should be regarded as one that is likely
to experience rising productivity, which, together with favorable demo-
graphics, points to economic growth that outpaces the global average......So
we opted for the following: any economy outside the so-called developed
world that accounts for at least 1% of current global GDP should be de-
ned as a growth economy.      Jim ONeill (M.D. & Head of
Global Economic Research at Goldman Sachs)
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the average growth rate of Brazil, Russia, India and China,
or BRICs, has outpaced the global average with their cumulative share in the world
GDP growing from about 16% in 2000 to 26% in 2011. China and India stand 2nd
and 3rd in world GDP ranking by PPP comparisons (the top spot still belongs to
the United States), while Russia and Brazil ranks 6th and 7th (Table 1).
<Table 1 about here>
The broad facts of BRIC resurgence are generally well known (Table 21). While
Brazil and India started the 1960s closer to their US and OECD counterparts, China
faltered2. During the 1970s, China played catch-up and Brazil grew steadily, but
India declined. The tables turn in the 1980s with Brazilian growth slowing as India
made a come-back. 1990s were a period of economic and political turbulence for
the BRICs though the negative impact was stronger in Brazil and Russia. Finally,
during the last decade of 2000s, all BRIC nations made a remarkable come-back
surpassing their historical performance with China in the lead.
<Table 2 about here>
In this paper, we perform an exploratory analysis of the uctuations in output
of the BRIC economies over the last two decades - the relative stagnation of the
1990s followed by the economic recovery of the 2000s  using the Business Cycle
Accounting (BCA) wedgemethodology formulated by Cole and Ohanian (2004)
and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (henceforth CKM, 2007) amongst others.
Taking a cue from Calvo (2000), BCA focuses not on identication of primary
forces like policy changes or institutional reforms that a¤ect the economy, rather on
1Tables 1 and 2 are from the IMF and Angus Maddisons online data resources. Details of the
historial timeline are in the online appendix.
2Per capita GDP growth rate is low in Brazil compared to aggregate GDP growth due to an
expanding population.
the channels through which these factors work. The technique uses an real busi-
ness cycle (RBC) framework with four channels: time varying productivity ("e¢ -
ciency wedges"), labor taxes ("labor wedges"), taxes on investment ("investment
wedges") and government consumption3 ("government consumption wedge"). The
BCAmethodology is implemented in two steps. In step one, the rst order conditions
of a standard RBC model along with macroeconomic data is used to estimate the
wedges. In step two, the estimated wedges from step 1 are fed back into the model
individually and in di¤erent combinations to ascertain their marginal contributions
in generating the observed economic outcome4.
Application of the BCA methodology to the BRICs identies two major chan-
nels at work: i) Brazilian and Russian crisis of the 1990s is primarily the result of
distortions in investment and labor markets (particularly in Brazil). The growth of
the 2000s however is the handiwork of improvements in e¢ ciency; ii) in contrast,
in China and India, both relatively stable in the 1990s, e¢ ciency wedges play an
important role till mid-2000s, after which declining investment market distortions
became increasingly important for the rapid recovery5. These ndings suggest that
institutional and policy reforms at the core of the BRIC resurgence worked primarily
by increasing production e¢ ciency and reducing investment market frictions to aid
capital accumulation. Our primary ndings are robust to three additional checks -
(a) introduction of capital adjustment costs, known to alter benchmark BCA results
(Christiano and Davis, 2006); (b) factor hoarding to address concerns about misman-
agement of e¢ ciency wedges and (c) small, open economy setting as in most BRICs
with separation of transitory and trend shocks a¤ecting productivity ( Aguiar and
Gopinath, 2007),
Our application adds to the extensive literature on BCA (CKM, 2007; Kersting,
2008; Chakraborty, 2009; Kobayashi and Inaba, 2006; Cho and Doblas-Madrid 2012,
Otsu 2010a; Lama 2011), with the exception that in contrast to the existing studies
our objective is to study not just a crisis, but the eventual recovery. Secondly, while
China and India, has garnered most attention amongst the BRICs (Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti 2011, Dekle and Vandenbroucke 2012, Jones and Sahu, 2009; Hseih
and Klenow 2009), we bring all BRIC nations on the same analytical platform to
perform a joint analysis over an extended time period (1990 to 2009). This turns
out to be crucial for unearthing the role of investment market frictions, a channel
mostly ignored in BCA literature with a few exceptions. Focusing separately on
periods of crisis and recovery we nd, similar to Cavalcanti, Elosegui, McCandless &
3In a closed economy set-up, net exports are added to government consumption.
4For example, if BCA exercise identies e¢ ciency wedges as a major player, the interpretation
is that whatever primary factors are responsible for output growth, they work by improving the
nations e¢ ciency (or productivity).
5The role of labor and government consumption wedges turn out to be somewhat sensitive to
model specications.
Blanco (2008), that worsening investment frictions can explain a signicant portion of
business cycle downturns. We further detect that declining investment frictions and
capital accumulation can also help sustain growth. This contrasts with the earlier
ndings of Jones and Sahu (2008) for India and Lama (2011) for Latin America,
where a sample till mid-2000s undermines the potential role of investment market
uctuations.
Finally, we attempt to tie the observed wedge patterns with some indices of insti-
tutional and policy changes in the BRICs. A growing literature in recent years have
found micro-level evidence of inuence of credit market movements on investment
and economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2011; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan
and Sayek, 2009). BRICs followed a consistent policy of easing credit with priva-
tization, nancial liberalization and opening up6. The impact of such policies is
observed in improved credit-ratings and credit availability. Indices of institutional
and political reforms published by the World Bank suggests improvement in govern-
ment e¤ectiveness in all BRICs and political stability (mostly in Russia) that are
conducive to growth and recovery, but other areas of concern remain, with control
of corruption being the Achillesheel.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2; we describe
the business cycle accounting model. In section 3; we explain the business cycle
accounting procedure and present the results. In section 4; we provide sensitivity
analysis results. In section 5; we discuss the underlying factors that can explain the
evolution of wedges. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Benchmark Model
BCA methodology uses a standard, closed economy neoclassical growth model with
a representative household, rm and a government. The representative rm hires
labor and capital from the household to produce output using a constant returns to
scale technology, which is a¤ected by time-varying production e¢ ciency. The repre-
sentative household decides on consumption, labor and investment each period. The
household faces a budget constraint where its expenditure is limited by its labor and
capital income. In addition, as the ultimate owner of the rm, the consumer receives
the prots. The consumer pays distortionary taxes on labor and capital income to
the government. In the BCA framework, these distortionary taxes represent broader
economic distortions that a¤ect the factor markets. The government uses its tax rev-
enue to nance government consumption. Any remaining amount is transferred back
to the households as lump sum transfers. Exogenous shocks to production e¢ ciency,
6We explain the details in the online appendix.
government consumption and distortionary tax rates are revealed in the beginning
of each period and a¤ect economic incentives.
2.1 Firm
The representative rm borrows capital Kt and labor Lt from the household in order
to produce output Yt according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = K

t (AtLt)
1 ;
where At denotes exogenous production e¢ ciency. Labor is dened as total hours
worked (product of employment and hours worked per worker). Productivity can be
divided into a trend component  t and a cyclical component zt, i.e. At = zt t, where
we assume a constant growth rate  in the trend component in the benchmark model.
Labor grows over time due to constant growth in population Nt at the rate of n.
Output and capital grows over time due to both population and productivity growth.
All variables are detrended by the growth trends in order to dene a stationary
problem:
yt =
Yt
Nt t
; kt =
Kt
Nt t
; lt =
Lt
Nt
; zt =
At
 t
:
The detrended production function can be rewritten as
yt = k

t (ztlt)
1 : (1)
The detrended prot maximization problem is
maxt = yt   rtkt   wtlt (2)
where rt and wt denote the real return on capital and the real wage respectively. For
the benchmark model, we follow CKM (2007) and dene the e¢ ciency wedges as the
detrended productivity:
!e;t = zt: (3)
2.2 The Household and Government
The representative household gains utility from consumption ct and leisure 1   lt
where we assume a log-linear utility function7:
u(ct; 1  lt) = 	 ln ct + (1 	) ln(1  lt):
7We also conduct an exercise with Cobb-Douglas preferences with higher elasticity of substitution
presented in the appendix.
Total hours available is normalized to one. The household maximizes its expected
lifetime utility:
maxEt
P
t
t [u(ct; 1  lt)] ;
where  is the subjective discount factor. The household budget constraint is
(1   l;t)wtlt + (1   k;t) rtkt + t +  t = ct + xt; (4)
where  lt and  kt are distortionary labor and capital income taxes while  t is the
lump-sum government transfers. Investment xt is dened by the capital law of mo-
tion:
nkt+1 = xt + (1  )kt: (5)
The government collects distortionary taxes from the household in order to -
nance consumption and the balance is transferred to the household in a lump-sum
fashion. Therefore, the government budget constraint is:8
gt +  t =  ltwtlt +  ktrtkt: (6)
Combining the government budget constraint (6) and the household budget con-
straint (4) making use of the denition of prots (2), we obtain the resource constraint
yt = ct + xt + gt: (7)
Since government consumption reduces the available resources for the private sector
in the economy, we dene this as the government consumption wedge following CKM
(2007):
!g;t = gt: (8)
Labor and investment wedges f!l;t; !k;tg are dened as:
!l;t = 1   lt;
!k;t = 1   kt:
Technically speaking,  lt drives a wedge between the consumption-leisure marginal
rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor while  kt drives a wedge
between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the marginal return on
investment. If there are no market distortions,  lt and  kt would be zero implying
!l;t = !k;t = 1: This would yield the rst best outcome (as can be seen from the rst
order conditions outlined in section 2:4).
8Note that under the traditional BCA architecture (CKM, 2007), the labor and capital wedges
are modeled as taxes on labor income and capital income respectively, yielding the usual government
budget constraint.
2.3 Wedges
We dene the e¢ ciency, government consumption, investment and labor wedges
!t = (!e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t)
0 such that an increase in each wedge should lead to an
increase in output. Increases in e¢ ciency wedge directly increases production and
stimulates factor demand by increasing the marginal product of inputs. On the
other hand, increases in labor (1    lt) and investment wedges (1    kt), which
by construction imply a decline in labor market friction  lt or investment market
friction  kt respectively, stimulate output by encouraging the household to increase
supply of factor inputs through an increase in the marginal income associated with
them. An increase in government consumption wedge increases output by increasing
aggregate demand9. Following CKM (2007), we assume that the wedges are ex-
ogenous and follow a stochastic process. Dening a vector of log-linearized wedges,e!t = (g!e;t;g!g;t;g!k;t; f!l;t)0 where e!t = ln!t   ln!, we assume that the wedges follow
a rst order VAR process:
e!t = Pg!t 1 + "t (9)
"t  N(0; V )
where "t = ("e;t; "g;t; "k;t; "l;t)
0 are innovations to the wedges. Following CKM (2007)
we allow spill-over of wedges through P and contemporaneous correlations of inno-
vations in V .
2.4 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is given by a price vector frt; wtg and an allocation
of quantities fyt; ct; xt; lt; kt; zt; gt;  t; !e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;tg such that: (a) the household
maximizes utility given frt; wt;  t; !k;t; !l;tg; (b) the rm maximizes prots given
frt; wt; ztg; (c) the government budget constraint (6) and the resource constraint (7)
holds; and (d) the wedges follow the stochastic process (9). The competitive equilib-
rium is characterized by a set of rst-order conditions given by: (a) the capital Euler
equation (rst order condition with respect to capital) equalizing present discounted
value of marginal utility of future consumption to its marginal cost:
1
ct
= bEt  1
ct+1

!k;t+1
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  

; (10)
where b = 
n
, (b) the rst-order condition with respect to labor equating marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the marginal product of
9Aggregate demand is comprised of household consumption, private investment and government
expenditure.
labor:
1 	
	
ct
1  lt = !l;t(1  )
yt
lt
; (11)
(c) the resource constraint (7) given (8), (d) the capital law of motion (5), and (e)
the production function (1) given (3).
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Parameter Values
We collect annual national accounts data for the period 1990 to 2009 from Penn
World Tables (PWT) 7:0., its updated version (PWT 7:1 published in November,
2012) and its extensions made by Duncan Foley. In addition, we collect population
data from LABORSTA database of International Labor Organization and household
expenditure data from Euromonitor Global Market Information database. The de-
tails of data construction are outlined in the data appendix. The key parameter and
steady state values are listed in Table 3.
The rst step in BCA implementation is to obtain the parameters of the model
through usual calibration techniques for each country. Capital share  is calibrated to
match the capital income share derived from data10. The productivity growth trend
a is computed as the average growth rate of per capita output. The population
growth trend n is directly computed from adult population data11. The annual
depreciation rate  is computed from total capital stock and investment data12. The
preference weight 	 is calibrated using the steady state labor rst order condition
(11) to match the average consumption-output ratio and labor level in data assuming
that the steady state labor wedge is equal to one13. The steady state e¢ ciency wedge
is normalized to one. The steady state government consumption wedge is calibrated
to match the average consumption-output ratio and investment-output ratio.
The next step is to estimate the stochastic process of the wedges (9) for which we
employ the Bayesian techniques. Structural estimation is necessary for the business
cycle accounting procedure since investment wedges depend on expectations about
the future state of the economy which is not directly observable. The estimated
10We follow Gollin (2002) and compute the income share of capital from national income statistics.
These are 0:474, 0:475, 0:294, and 0:401 for Brazil, Russia, India and China respectively. We further
adjust for the imputed service income from consumer durables as explained in the data appendix.
11We used total population for China since we do not have adult population data.
12We construct the total capital stock series as the sum of net xed capital stock and house-
hold durables and the total investment series as the sum of gross domestic capital formation and
household expenditures on durables.
13This assumption is not important as the preference weight and steady state level of labor wedges
do not appear in the linearized system of equations.
parameters are the lag parameters in P , the standard deviation of the errors, and the
cross-correlations between the errors in V . We also estimate the subjective discount
factor b along with the steady state investment wedge14. Since there are 4 exogenous
variables, we use the time series data of output, consumption, investment and labor
as observables. The Bayesian priors and the point estimates of these parameters are
listed in the appendix.
3.2 Simulation
First, linear decision rules are derived using Uhlig (1999). Once we have the linear
decision rules, we can back out the values of the linearized wedges using the data of
output, consumption, investment and labor and their decision rules15. In the second
step we compute the reaction of endogenous variables to the changes in the wedges by
plugging their time series into the linear decision rules one-by-one. Upon reporting
our results, we dene a contribution indicator of each wedge !j on an endogenous
variable v (Otsu , 2010b):
contvj = corr(
fv!jt ; evt)  std(fv!jt )std(evt)
=
cov(fv!jt ; evt)
var(evt) ;
where fv!jt is the linearized uctuation of variable v in response tof!j while evt is that
of the data of variable v. By construction, plugging in all wedges into the model will
exactly reproduce the observable data soX
j
contvj = 1:
due to linearity. Therefore, we can consider the value of the indicator as the contri-
bution of each wedge to the uctuation of the variable of interest.
3.3 Results
In Figure 1, we present the linearly detrended macroeconomic variables in BRICs
during 1990   200916: In reporting our results, we show the log deviations of the
14We cannot make a distinction between b and !k in the benchmark model so the estimated
values are the same. However, they are distinguishable in the alternative models we explore in the
following section.
15The detailed procedure is explained in the appendix.
16The variables are plotted as log deviations from their 1990 value (1992 in case of Russia) and
detrended using the average growth rate during the sample period. We also conduct a robustness
check detrending all countries by a common rate of 1.5% in the appendix.
variables with respect to the steady state.
<Figure 1 about here>
In Figure 2, we plot the time paths of the computed wedges for each country.
For the most part, we do not nd much commonality in wedge movements in the four
nations. For example, while e¢ ciency wedges have been above the trend in Brazil
and Russia throughout the entire period, it has been below trend for most of the
time in India and China. In Brazil, there was a temporary slow down in the growth
of e¢ ciency during 1997   2003. In Russia, it took o¤ in 1998 and kept growing
at an enormous rate, suggesting a positive impact of e¢ ciency on growth. In India,
while e¢ ciency wedges temporarily improved in 2005, since then it has suddenly
collapsed. In China, while e¢ ciency wedges deteriorated during the 1995   2001
period, it shows a gradually improvement ever since. It is hard to nd common
patterns in government consumption wedges and labor wedges as well, except for
China and Brazil that saw an improvement in government consumption wedge during
mid-2000s. Perhaps the one common trend would be investment wedge movements,
that show improvements in all BRIC nations since 2000s, though still below trend in
Brazil and Russia while above trend in India and China at the end of 2009.
<Figure 2 and Table 4 about here>
In Table 4, we report the standard deviation of wedges with respect to output
and the correlations of wedges with output for various leads and lags17 to ascer-
tain various comovements. The standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. A
positive correlation indicates a positive association between a given wedge and the
observed economic outcome, and vice versa. E¢ ciency wedges, for the most part,
are positively correlated with output in all countries, and signicantly so for Russia,
India and China. Investment wedges also show a positive correlation for the most
part, particularly signicant in India. Labor wedges are positively correlated with
output in Brazil and Russia, but negatively correlated in India. In China, while la-
bor wedges become positively correlated for contemporaneous periods and leads +1,
+2, the magnitude remains low. As for government consumption wedges, while they
are positively correlated with output in Brazil (with the exception of the leads +1,
+2); in India, and China, they are negatively correlated with output in Russia for
all leads and lags. Next, we feed the back the wedges in our model individually and
report their contribution to output uctuations in Figure 3 and decompositions in
Table 5. The recovery period of 2000  2009 is discussed specically as well.
17As dened in CKM (2007), a "k   th lag" is the correlation between the t  k th value of the
variable of interest with output at period t.
<Figure 3 and Table 5 about here>
In Brazil, e¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges all contribute signicantly ex-
plaining 30:2%, 30:6%, and 52:8% of output uctuations respectively. E¢ ciency
wedges are particularly signicant in the 2000s with a contribution of 98:7%, while
the contributions of investment and labor wedges, though positive, are much lower.
E¢ ciency improvements by themselves predict output to be 14 percentage points
above the trend by 2009. Investment and labor wedges for their part account for
the sub-par economic performance of the 1990s and only marginally contribute to
the recovery of the 2000s. A similar pattern is observed in Russia with e¢ ciency
wedges contributing higher than 100% while investment wedges having a large neg-
ative e¤ect. The model with only e¢ ciency wedges predicts a much faster economic
recovery leading to a much higher output level in the 2000s than it actually did.
On the other hand, investment wedges by themselves predict a decline in output
throughout the entire period, contributing to the 1990s crisis. Our ndings suggest
that e¢ ciency wedges aided Russia to get back on the development track in spite of
sub-par investment market conditions.
In India, investment wedges contribute the most to the uctuation of output with
an overall contribution of 63:2% over the entire period. This is mainly because of
the 2000s where the contribution of investment wedge rises to 71:2%. Interestingly,
during the 1990s the contribution of e¢ ciency wedge at 73:1% was much higher than
that of the investment wedge at 20:6%. When we run the model with only e¢ ciency
wedge, it performs quite well in predicting the uctuation in output until 2005.
However, it fails to predict the rapid growth after 2005. This is where the investment
wedge comes in and investment wedges alone do a better job of accounting for the
rapid acceleration of Indian growth during the 2000s well to the sample end. Labor
and government consumption wedge have a minimal contribution. China presents a
similar picture. E¢ ciency wedges account for 82:6% of output uctuations overall.
However, during the 2000s the contribution of investment wedges, at 85:2%, becomes
larger than that of e¢ ciency wedges, at 30:3%. Mirroring the experience of India,
e¢ ciency wedges fail to account for the rapid growth after 2004, while investment
wedges continue to be an important contributor to the economic development.
In summary, we primarily document that while Brazilian and Russian booms were
facilitated by improvements in production e¢ ciency, India and China benetted from
declines in investment market frictions, particularly in the latter half of the 2000s.
The contributions of labor and government consumption wedges to the recovery
remain marginal across the spectrum.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we will test the robustness of the benchmark model to alternative
settings: a model with investment adjustment costs; a factor hoarding model; and
a small open economy model with stochastic trends18. We report additional key
parameter values in Table 6.
4.1 Model with Investment Adjustment Costs
In the benchmark model capital stock is accumulated following the capital law of mo-
tion (5). However, Christiano and Davis (2006) claim that introducing investment
adjustment cost could a¤ect the relative importance of the wedges. In this sec-
tion we modify the capital accumulation equation to include quadratic investment
adjustment costs:
nkt+1 = xt + (1  )kt   

xt
kt

kt (12)
where


xt
kt

=

2

xt
kt
  
2
:
The constant  is set at  = na  (1  ) so that the adjustment cost is equal to zero
in the steady state. The parameter  is calibrated to match the marginal Tobins Q
to one:
d log q
d log (x=k)
= 1;
where q is the e¤ective price of investment relative to consumption:
q =
1
1  0 :
This leads to  = k
x
:
<Figure 4 and Table 7 about here>
We plot the simulation results of output in Figure 4. Output decompositions
are presented in Table 7. While the results are quite similar to those from the
benchmark model, some subtle di¤erences are noted. First, the impact of investment
wedge increases (both negatively for Russia and positively for the rest). Second, the
18Equilibrium conditions are listed in the appendix.
role of government wedge increases considerably in India during the 1990s and in
China during the 2000s. Third, the role of e¢ ciency wedges decline considerably in
India and China. Nonetheless, the main result that the emergence of India and China
is mainly accounted for by improvements in investment wedges and the recovery of
Brazil and Russia is mainly accounted for by improvements in e¢ ciency wedges holds.
4.2 Factor Hoarding Model
In the benchmark model e¢ ciency wedges are measured as Solow residuals. However,
Solow residuals misrepresent production e¢ ciency when production factors are mis-
measured due to factor hoarding. We apply the factor hoarding BCA model of
Klein and Otsu (2013) to the BRIC economies in order to test the robustness of our
main results. The di¤erence between the benchmark model and the factor hoarding
model is that in the latter the rate of factor utilization is time-varying. In terms of
labor utilization, increasing utilization increases labor input on one hand and reduces
utility on the other as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993). The preference
is dened as
u(ct; 1  lt) = 	 ln ct + (1 	) ln(1  lt)  ltul;t;
where ul;t is the endogenous labor utilization rate. In terms of capital utilization,
increasing utilization increases capital input on one hand and increases the depreci-
ation rate of capital on the other as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988).
The depreciation rate is dened as
t = u

k;t;
where uk;t is the endogenous capital utilization rate. The elasticity parameters  and
 are obtained through structural estimation jointly with the stochastic process.
<Figure 5 and Table 8 about here>
The output simulations are plotted in Figure 5 while the output decompositions
are presented in Table 8. The gures look similar to those in the benchmark case
except for Russia. In Brazil, the contribution of investment wedges fall whereas the
contributions of e¢ ciency and labor wedges increase. In Russia, investment wedges
not only account for the decline in output during the 1990s but also part of the
recovery in the 2000s. Moreover, labor wedges have the highest contribution during
the 2000s instead of e¢ ciency wedges. Nonetheless, the combination of e¢ ciency
and investment wedges account for nearly half of the uctuation in output during
the 2000s. In India, the contribution of investment increases whereas the contribu-
tion of e¢ ciency wedges fall. In China, the contribution of e¢ ciency wedges increase
whereas the contribution of investment wedges fall. Despite the change in the quan-
titative impact of the wedges, the result that e¢ ciency and investment wedges are
important in accounting for the emergence of the BRICs in the 2000s holds even
with endogenous factor hoarding.
4.3 Small Open Economy Model with Stochastic Trend
The benchmark model considers a closed economy, though the BRICs were far from
closed to the international trade and nancial markets during the 1990 2009 period.
Furthermore, the benchmark model denes e¢ ciency wedges as temporary shocks to
productivity whereas the BRIC economies experienced large business cycle uctua-
tions with possible structural breaks over the 1990   2009 period, which might be
better explained by shocks to productivity growth trends. Therefore, we construct a
small open economy model with cyclical and trend components of productivity based
on Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)19. In the benchmark model the trade balance was
included in the government consumption wedge whereas in this model the two are
distinguished. In the small open economy model the trade balance is dened as the
net ow of international assets dt :
tbt = nQdt+1   dt;
whereQ is the xed price of the asset. The resource constraint is modied accordingly
as:
yt = ct + xt + gt + tbt:
Next, we dene the growth trend  t = tt where t grows at a constant rate 
and t is a random walk variable. We dene trend wedges as shocks to the growth
rate of the random walk component:
!;t =
t
t 1
:
Incorporating trend wedges into a small open economy model is convenient for BCA.
Since we need as many observable variables as wedges, we can add government con-
sumption, separate from the trade balance, as an observable variable while adding
the trend wedge. Now we have a model with ve wedges and ve observable variables
to conduct the structural estimation and simulation20.
<Figure 6 and Table 9 about here>
19Rothert and Rahmati (2011) also apply BCA to the Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) model.
20On estimating the stochastic process, we impose a restriction on the lag matrix P such that
there is no spill-over into/from the trend wedge from/into the other wedges.
The output simulations are plotted in Figure 6 while Table 9 provides the
decomposition results. The gures show that adding the trend wedge does not change
the general patterns. In Brazil, e¢ ciency wedges are the most important driver of
output uctuation especially during the 2000s while labor and investment wedges
accounted for the stagnation during the 1990s. The trend wedges have helped the
economy during the 2000s. In Russia, e¢ ciency wedges are important in accounting
for the slump in the 1990s and the emergence in the 2000s. Investment wedges
have a strong negative e¤ect on output throughout the entire period. In India,
e¢ ciency wedges are important in accounting for the sub-par output growth during
the 1990s while investment wedges are important in accounting for the emergence
during the 2000s. In China, e¢ ciency wedges can account for most of the uctuation
in output while investment wedges have been helping the economy throughout the
entire period. On the other hand, trend and labor wedges have been dragging the
economy down. Therefore, once again the ndings suggest that e¢ ciency wedges for
Brazil and Russia and investment wedges for China and India are the key drivers for
the output boom during the 2000s:
5 Discussion: Decomposition, Wedges and Poli-
cies
The accounting results highlight the importance of e¢ ciency and investment wedges
in output uctuations. Can we tie our wedge uctuations to some primary factors
like institutional and policy reforms?
After the 1990s debt and nancial crisis that hit all BRICs but China21, 2000s
was a period of reforms. Brazil attempted scal stabilization with reduction of ina-
tion indexed debt, while Russia took steps to privatize and liberalize after undergoing
ruble devaluation and debt default. Indias foreign exchange crisis in 1991 and the
subsequent $1:8 billion IMF bailout required de-licensing the "license Raj" and en-
couraging FDI. Chinas WTO membership also required conforming to substantial
liberalization measures like removing foreign exchange controls and import quotas
(details of these measure are outlined in online Appendix 5).
As a result of these measures, credit availability (Figure 7a) and credit wor-
thiness (Figure 7b)22 both improved , leading to an improvement in the observed
investment wedges. Financial liberalization increases the availability of capital by
removing investment market distortions and enables rms to seize protable invest-
ment opportunities. As a result, investment rises which brings down its expected
21China had its own share of political troubles brewing from the Tiananmen Square massacre of
1989.
22Data is collected from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (henceforth, WCY)
return due to diminishing marginal product of capital. Therefore, the gap between
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the expected return on capital
shrinks, and this would be reected in a higher value of investment wedge, 1   k;t;
in the BCA model.
Financial development is consistent with observed production e¢ ciency as well.
An increase in FDI leads to productivity spillovers through import of foreign man-
agerial and organizational talent (Findley, 1978). At the same time, international
nancial integration imposes market discipline (Rajan and Zingales, 2003), which is
conducive to growth.
To track market discipline, we turn to six institutional and governance indica-
tors tracked by the World Bank-Voice & Accountability, Political Stability & Non
Violence, Government E¤ectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Control of
Corruption (denitions and explanations are in the online appendix 6:3). These in-
dicators are measured on a scale of  2:5 (weak) to 2:5 (strong). We present their
evolution over the two decades in Table 10. Government e¤ectiveness stands out
with Brazil, Russia and China climbing 10 points in the world ranking, with India
climbing 2 points. Political stability, mostly in Russia, also aids the BRICs, though
control of corruption, which Antunes and Cavalcanti (2003) and Antunes, Cavalcanti
& Villamil (2008) have stressed is an important pillar of development, remains an
issue (Table 10 & Figure 7c).
<Table 10 and Figure 7c about here>
6 Conclusion
Using the BCA methodology to chart the remarkable recovery of the BRICs since
2000s, our paper documents the importance of e¢ ciency improvements and decline
in investment market frictions for economic growth. While the history and timeline
of improvement of these nations suggest that e¢ ciency improvement is essential to
jump-start growth after a crisis (Brazil and Russia), improvements in investment
market emerge as an important factor to help sustain growth (India and China).
Further analysis is needed to explore why this might be the case, and if indeed, this
is the pattern for all developing economies, or something of an aberration noticed
only in the BRICs.
From a policy perspective, while there have been some improvements in their
institutional and governance indicators, BRIC nations have a long way to go before
they catch up with the US standards. Control of corruption remains an area of
concern, as acknowledged by Dr. Kim, President, World Bank Group, who rea¢ rmed
on January 13; 2013, the World Banks commitment to act on anti-corruption in the
coming years, which could translate to a more vibrant, economically stronger BRICs.
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Table 5: Decomposition of Output - Benchmark Model
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:302 1:711 0:487 0:826
Government Consumption Wedges  0:137  0:033 0:013  0:025
Investment Wedges 0:308  0:711 0:632 0:190
Labor Wedges 0:528 0:033  0:131 0:009
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:571  0:086 0:731 1:237
Government Consumption Wedges  0:038  0:159 0:039  0:056
Investment Wedges 0:566 1:243 0:206  0:313
Labor Wedges 1:043 0:002 0:024 0:132
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:987 1:603 0:432 0:303
Government Consumption Wedges  0:140 0:032  0:01 0:052
Investment Wedges 0:076  0:716 :712 0:852
Labor Wedges 0:077 0:081  0:135  0:206
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Table 7: Decomposition of Output
Model with Investment Adjustment Costs
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:271 2:217 0:293 0:549
Government Consumption Wedges  0:092  0:027 0:089  0:136
Investment Wedges 0:381  1:248 0:703 0:616
Labor Wedges 0:441 0:058  0:085  0:030
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:658  0:023 0:352 0:925
Government Consumption Wedges 0:001  0:065 0:382  0:285
Investment Wedges 0:721 1:119 0:232 0:119
Labor Wedges 0:938  0:031 0:034 0:242
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:089 2:287 0:275 0:130
Government Consumption Wedges  0:068  0:041 0:004 0:235
Investment Wedges 0:022  1:379 :811 1:126
Labor Wedges  0:043 0:133  0:089  0:491
Table 8: Decomposition of Output
Factor Hoarding Model
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:703 0:200 0:329 1:031
Government Consumption Wedges  0:043 0:030 0:004  0:000
Investment Wedges  0:358 0:507 0:960  0:053
Labor Wedges 0:612 0:264  0:293 0:022
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:495  0:060 0:516 1:522
Government Consumption Wedges 0:078 0:100  0:016 0:089
Investment Wedges 0:080 0:967 0:381  0:779
Labor Wedges 1:337  0:127 0:120 0:169
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:144 0:286 0:337 0:469
Government Consumption Wedges 0:063  0:024 0:044  0:196
Investment Wedges  0:492 0:203 0:935 0:957
Labor Wedges 0:285 0:534  0:317  0:229
Table 9: Decomposition of Output
Small Open Economy Model with Stochastic Trend
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:760 1:243 0:320 1:267
Government Consumption Wedges 0:002  0:024 0:116 0:031
Investment Wedges 0:146  0:729 1:867  0:253
Labor Wedges 0:490 0:110  0:365 0:049
Trend Wedges  0:398 0:400  0:938  0:094
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:253 0:682 0:793 1:010
Government Consumption Wedges  0:055 0:028 0:109 0:033
Investment Wedges 0:433 0:477  0:141  0:645
Labor Wedges 0:790  0:098  0:085 0:524
Trend Wedges  0:420  0:090 0:325 0:078
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:931 1:034 0:263 1:802
Government Consumption Wedges 0:059  0:030 0:125 0:041
Investment Wedges  0:278  0:575 2:147 0:537
Labor Wedges 0:423 0:266  0:367  0:781
Trend Wedges  0:136 0:305  1:169  0:600
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Figure 1:  Real Macro Aggregates 
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 Note: "Output (Y)" includes GDP and the imputed service flow from consumer durables. It is decomposed into "Consumption (C)" that consists of household consumption of non-
durables and services (where the imputed service flow from consumer durables are included) and "Investment (X)" that includes gross domestic capital formation and household 
expenditures on consumer durables while the residual is defined as "Government Consumption (G)" so that Y=C+X+G "Labor (L)" represents total hours worked which consists of 
total employment and hours worked per workers. All variables are divided by the adult population. Output, consumption and investment are linearly detrended by the average per 
adult output growth rate over the 1990-2009 period setting 1990 at the trend level 
Source:  The data is primarily collected from the Penn World Tables edition 7.0, its updated version PWT 7.1 and its extension made by Duncan Foley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2:  Estimated Wedges in the benchmark model 
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 Figure 3:  Simulated Output in the benchmark model 
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 Figure 4:  Simulated output in the benchmark model adjusted for investment adjustment costs 
 
 
Note: A quadratic investment adjustment cost is introduced in an otherwise benchmark model to capture the fact that output cannot be costlessly transformed to capital stock 
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Figure 5: Simulated output in the benchmark model adjusted for factor hoarding 
 
 
 
Note: We modify the benchmark model to allow for variable utilization of labor and capital 
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Figure 6: Simulated output in a small, open economy model  
 
 
Note: We modify the closed economy benchmark model to a small, open economy set-up. In addition, wedges, cycles and trends are estimated jointly 
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Figure 7a: Flow of Domestic Credit to Private Sector and Inflows of FDI 
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Figure 7b: Financial Market Indicators 
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Figure 7c:  Measures of Institutional and Policy Reforms 
 
 
 
 
Note:  We provide the percentile rank of the BRICs over a given span of time (years 1996 –when the data first becomes available, 
2000, 2007 and 2009 –the end of our sample period) in terms of the six governance indicators. An improvement in rank is 
consistent with institutional improvement conducive to growth. 
 
 
ONLINE APPENDIX FOR "BUSINESS CYCLE
ACCOUNTING OF THE BRIC ECONOMIES"
June 1, 2013
1 Parameter Estimation
Given that investment wedges are not directly observable, we employ Bayesian tech-
niques to structurally estimate the parameters governing the stochastic process of
the wedges using data on output, consumption, investment and labor in Brazil, Rus-
sia, India and China. The parameters estimated are lag parameters in the transition
matrix of wedges, the standard deviations and correlation coe¢ cients that dene the
variance covariance matrix of the error terms and the steady state level of investment
wedges along with the subjective discount factor.
The estimation results for the benchmark model are presented in Tables A1 (a)-
(d). The left panel of the tables presents the prior distribution shape, mean, standard
error and support for each parameter. The right panel reports the posterior mode and
its standard error as well as the posterior mean and its 95 percent condence interval
for each parameter. We choose to use the posterior mode as our point estimates in
the simulations1.
The estimation gives a range of parameter estimates across countries. For in-
stance, in terms of the persistence parameters Russia has higher Pkk, Pee and Pll
compared to those in the other countries. This is reected in the strong trends in the
Russian wedges presented in Figure 2 of the text. In Brazil there are large positive
spillovers from investment wedges onto labor wedges, Plk. In Russia, the spillover
from government and labor wedges onto e¢ ciency wedges, Pge and Ple, are strongly
positive while that of investment wedges onto e¢ ciency wedges, Pke, is strongly neg-
ative. In India the spillover from e¢ ciency wedges onto government wedges, Pge, is
strongly positive while that of labor wedges onto investment wedges, Pkl, is strongly
negative. In China, the spillover of labor wedges onto investment wedges are strongly
negative. In terms of volatility, the standard deviation of the shocks to government
1Using the posterior mean for each parameter instead of the mode does not make much di¤erence
in the simulation results.
wedges g are larger than those to the other wedges in all countries. In addition,
Russia has a much lower k than other countries. Finally, in terms of correlation,
government wedges and labor wedges are strongly negatively correlated in Brazil and
Russia, i.e. gl is close to  1, while e¢ ciency wedges and labor wedges are strongly
negatively correlated in India, i.e. el is close to  1.
2 Simulation
The rst step in the simulation process is to solve the model for linear decision rules
for linearized endogenous variables gkt+1 and eqt = (eyt; ect; ext; elt)0 :
gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!t;eqt = C ekt +D e!t:
Note that the entire series of ekt can be directly generated from the equation (assuming
an initial value ek0 = 0):
gkt+1 = x
nak
ext + 1  
na
ekt;
and the observed series of investment. Then the wedges can be computed as
e!t = D 1 eqt   C ekt :
Once the wedges are computed, they are used for simulation. We compute the
endogenous reaction of selected variables to the changes in a chosen wedge f!j;t by
plugging its time series into the linear decision rules of endogenous variables:
gk!jt+1 = Afk!jt +Bf!j;t;fq!jt = Cfk!jt +Df!j;t:
By denition, plugging in all wedges into the model will exactly reproduce the ob-
servable data:
eq!t = C ekt +D e!t = C ekt +DD 1 eqt   C ekt = eqt:
Therefore, we can easily decompose the e¤ects of each wedges on the observables due
to linearity of the decision rules:
fq!et + fq!gt + fq!kt + fq!lt = eq!t :
3 Alternative Models
3.1 Factor Hoarding
3.1.1 Household
The households problem is
maxU =
P
t

	 ln ct + (1 	)
 
ln(1  lt)  ltul;t

sub:to !l;twtltul;t + !k;trtktuk;t + t +  t = ct + xt
nkt+1 = xt +
 
1  uk;t

kt
where ul;t and uk;t are labor and capital utilizations.
3.1.2 Firm
The rms problem is
maxt = yt   wtltul;t   rtktuk;t
sub:to yt = (ktuk;t)
 (!e;tltul;t)
1 
3.1.3 Equilibrium Conditions
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by the following 7 equations:
 
ct
= Et

1
ct+1

!k;t+1
yt+1
kt+1
+ 1  uk;t+1

1
1  lt = (  1)u

l;t
!l;t (1  ) yt
lt
=
1 	
	

  1
ct
1  lt
!k;t
yt
kt
= uk;t
yt = (ktuk;t)
 (!e;tltul;t)
1 
nkt+1 = xt +
 
1 + uk;t

kt
yt = ct + xt + !g;t
where there are 7 endogenous variables fkt+1; yt; ct; xt; lt; ul;t; uk;tg :
3.2 Small Open Economy Model with Stochastic Trends
3.2.1 Household
The households problem is
maxU =
P
t [	 ln ct + (1 	) ln(1  lt)]
sub:to !l;twtlt + !k;trtkt + dt + t +  t = ct + xt + nQtdt+1;
nkt+1 = xt + (1  )kt   tkt;
where
t =

2

xt
kt
  

2
:
3.2.2 Firm
The rms problem is
maxt = yt   wtlt   rtkt
sub:to yt = k

t (!e;ttlt)
1  :
3.2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium is characterized by the following 8 equations
1 	
	
ct
1  lt = !l;t (1  )
yt
lt
;
yt = k

t (!e;ttlt)
1  ;
nkt+1 = xt + (1  )kt   tkt;
yt = ct + xt + tbt + g!g;t;
tbt = nQdt+1   dt;
1
(1  0t)
	
ct
= bEt " 	
ct+1
 
!k;t+1
yt+1
kt+1
+
1 
1  0t+1
 1     t+1 + 0t+1xt+1kt+1
!#
;
Q
	
ct
= bEt  	
ct+1

;
t = !;tt 1;
where there are 8 endogenous variables fkt+1; dt+1; t; yt; ct; xt; lt; tbtg :
4 More Sensitivity Analysis
4.1 Non-Separable Preferences
In the benchmark model, we considered log preferences. In this section we consider
Cobb-Douglas preferences with a higher risk aversion parameter
u(ct; 1  lt) =
 
c	t (1  lt)1 	
1 
1   ;
where  = 52.
The alternation does not a¤ect the measurement of e¢ ciency, government and
labor wedges. However, since consumption and leisure are non-separable, the leisure
term shows up in the capital Euler equation and a¤ects the measurement of invest-
ment wedges. The decomposition results reported in Table A2 show that the results
are very similar to the benchmark model.
4.2 Common Growth Trend
In the benchmark model we focus on the medium term cycles and detrend all variables
with the average output growth rate over the period. If we instead consider the
implication of wedges on long run growth, we should consider an alternative growth
trend. In this section we consider the trend growth rate to be 1:5% which is the
average US GDP per capita growth rate over the sample period 1990  2009.
Changing the trend does not a¤ect the measurement of e¢ ciency, government
and labor wedges. However, the alternation of the growth trend a¤ects the capital
Euler equation. Furthermore, for China and India there will be a noticeable growth
trend in the detrended data which a¤ects the estimation. Finally, one caveat for this
detrending method is that we have to dene the level of the long run growth path.
We report results for simulations assuming that the economies start at the long run
trend level in 1990, however, obviously this may not be the case.
The decomposition results are reported in Table A3. The results for Brazil is
almost identical to those in the benchmark model. In Russia, the importance of
investment wedges signicantly increases. Specically, the recovery during the 2000s
are captured primarily by improvements in investment climate. In India, the de-
trended output has a growing trend which can be accounted for by e¢ ciency wedges.
The results for China are quite di¤erent from the benchmark case. The rapid growth
throughout the entire period is fully accounted for by continuous improvements in
investment wedges.
2The benchmark model can be considered as a special case when  = 1.
4.3 The E¤ect of the Global Recession
In the benchmark results, we consider the 1990   2009 period. From Figure 1 we
can see that the global recession of 2008 a¤ected the BRIC economies in di¤erent
extents. In Brazil, output growth slowed down in 2008 but was still faster than its
trend level. In Russia, the recession hit the economy sharply on 2009. In India and
China, the impact of the recession was felt in 2008. In this section, we will remove
the nal two years from the sample in order to focus on the pre-global recession
period.
In order to make a comparison to the benchmark case, we maintain the trend
levels the same and simply remove the nal two entries of the dataset. The calibrated
parameters remain the same but the stochastic process is reestimated and the simu-
lation is based on the newly estimated parameters. The contribution of each wedges
are computed over the 1990  2007 period.
The decomposition results are reported inTable A4. The results for Brazil shows
that the overall contribution of e¢ ciency wedges falls while that of labor wedges rises.
Nonetheless, the main result that the labor wedges are responsible for the downturn
during the 1990s and the e¢ ciency wedges played an important role in the growth
during the 2000s holds. In Russia, the results are very similar to those from the
benchmark simulation. In India and China, the overall contribution of e¢ ciency
wedges rise while that of investment wedges fall during the 2000s as compared to the
benchmark which is to be expected since investment wedges have started playing a
major role only since 2005 and our sub-sample ends at 2007:
5 Institutional & Policy Reforms -BRICs over the
decades
While Brazil, Russia, India and China share impressive growth experiences in the
2000s leading economists to club them into one group, each has its unique history
and time path to present growth. To better understand the BRIC patterns of
growth, we start by looking deeper into their economic performance and policies
that led to their economic resurgence, one country at a time.
5.1 Brazil
Brazil has experienced turbulent periods of boom and bust since the early 20th
century. During the late 1930s well into the 1940s, external shocks like the Great
Depression and World War II as well as internal focus on protectionism isolated
Brazilian economy from much of the developed world. However, the proactive role
of the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank ensured the
growth of trade and a period of economic recovery during the later 1950s and 1960s.
The government and the private sector borrowed heavily from abroad to generate this
high economic growth, which was proved unsustainable as the accumulated foreign
debt caused a debt crisis when oil prices increased in both 1974 and 1979 and the
interest rates rose in 1980 (Cardoso and Teles, 2010)3. The 1980s came to be known
as the lost decade of Brazil illustrated with low economic growth accompanied by
a decline in productivity (Graminho 2006). As the government tried to nance the
scal imbalances through seigniorage, it created high ination over the decade.
In the early 1990s, in order to turn around the stagnant economy and reduce
government debt, the government moved towards privatization of ine¢ cient state-
owned-enterprises, which increased productivity (Schmitz and Teixeira, 2008), and
output started to recover in 1993. Following the East Asian growth model, nan-
cial liberalization took place as prohibition on FDI into certain sectors was lifted
and bureaucratic obstacles were reduced (de Paula 2007). In order to contain the
ination, the government instituted the Real Plan in 1994 pegging its currency
to the US dollar. However, the xed exchange rate regime collapsed in 1999. After
the currency crisis, as a condition on the $41 billion loan received in 1998, the gov-
ernment accepted the IMF Article V III obligations which precludes members from
imposing foreign exchange restrictions. To further improve the investment climate,
2000 Fiscal Responsibility Actwas put in place, imposing severe penalties on ad-
ministrators who exceed budget limits. Federal debt was restructured, eliminating
currency-indexed bonds, reducing ination-indexed debt and increasing xed-rate
proportion. These measures upgraded Brazils investment grade status (BNY Mel-
lon). While net inows of FDI slowed down after the crisis, their percentage to GDP
averaged 2:7% during the 2000s, almost doubling over the previous decades.
A virtuous cycle of BRIC emergence helped Brazil during the 2000s as growing
China increased its demand for commodities, of which Brazil had a comparative
advantage. As reported by ISI Emerging Markets Brazils exports to China grew
by a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 46:9% annually while imports from
China grew by a CAGR of 37:8% annually from 1999 to 2010. The growth rates are
high compared to its aggregate exports and imports which saw a CAGR of 12:7%
and 11:5% respectively. By 2009, growth in Brazil-China trade catapulted China
as Brazils largest trade partner, overtaking the United States. China presently
accounts for 14:7% of Brazils total trade ows. Overall average annual growth rate
of exports increased to 7:13% almost catching up with the pre-1980s numbers.
3While average annual growth rate of exports of goods and services stood at 10:5% during the
later 1970s and early 1980s, the growth rate dropped to 5:3% in mid to late 1980s and early 1990s.
5.2 Russia
The political disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Block in 1991 and formation of
the Russian Federation makes Russia a unique country for our analysis. Since the
economic and political movements of the earlier Soviet Union are too vast to concisely
summarize in our paper, we begin our discussion by an analysis of the newly found
Russian Federation. After the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world saw
a transition of yet another socialistic economy to a more market based economic
structure. President Boris Yelstin, who took the reins of the new country, vowed
radical, market-oriented reforms, referred to as a shock therapy for its abrupt
nature.
Russias initial experience with market economy did not go smoothly as hyperin-
ation coupled with unsustainable government budget decits prevailed during the
1990s. In addition, political unrest due to the emergence of oligarchs who now came
to control the vast earlier state-owned enterprises bred discontent while the war in
Chechnya did not help matters. The failure of exchange rate-based stabilization in
1995 and disappointing macroeconomic performance eventually led to the Russian
Financial Crisis in 1998 (Merlevede, Schoors and Van Aarle 2009). When the Asian
Financial Crisis led to a decline in the demand for crude oil (one of Russias biggest
exports), the economy was further hit and growth numbers turned negative. Annual
growth rate of exports fell to the tune of 1:8%, while aggregate GDP growth fell by
4:8% (per capita GDP fell by 4:9%), requiring a $22:6 billion bailout from IMF and
World Bank. To stabilize Russia, leaders of the G  8 also agreed to explore ways to
write-o¤ the old Soviet debt that Russia had assumed. Government of Russia also
took pro-active steps to curtail the e¤ects of a sudden decline in oil prices- a hard
lesson learned during the East Asian Crisis- with the set-up of the Oil Stabilization
Fund of Russian Federation in 2004.
After surviving the political turmoil of early 1990s and the 1998 crisis, Russia too
instituted strong reforms outlined in two resolutions: (a) Measures Planned by the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Federa-
tion to Stabilize Socioeconomic Conditions in Russia (Nov 16; 1998) and (b) Letter
of Development Policy for the Third Structural Adjustment Loan (July 19; 1999).
While the rst plan was more consistent with Russian system of state control, the
second plan was formulated after consultations with international nancial institu-
tions. In a move towards privatization, 15 companies were identied to be privatized
by early 2000s. The government also lifted the January 1999 moratorium on insol-
vency claims of companies, encouraging private investment. However, on the trade
front, government re-introduced export tari¤s and quotas in a bid to reign in Russian
over-dependence on international trade.
President Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Boris Yelstin, spearheaded a concerted
e¤ort to revamp infrastructure and increase production, both industrial and agrarian.
The Oil Stabilization Fund played a crucial role in maintaining the scal surplus
through the oil revenue. According to de Paula (2007), some exibility in the scal
policy was introduced in 2006 with the creation of an Investment Fund in the federal
budget. The aim of the fund is to nance infrastructure investment and innovation
related projects in joint public-private partnerships. The recent 2008 global crisis
hit Russia comparatively harder than its BRIC peers due to Russian dependence on
crude oil and commodities trade for its economy4. However, the recovery was also
swift as output growth turned positive in mid-2009, and by 2010, GDP growth rate
reached 4:0%, after a negative growth of  7:8% in 2009 (GDP per capita growth
rates are comparable).
5.3 India
After emerging from its colonial era in 1947, India embarked on a socialistic develop-
ment path by successive formulation of the "Five Year Plans" of economic growth.
The central tenets of the growth plans were an emphasis on the public sector, strong
move towards licensing and import restrictions and agrarian development. After
a relative slowdown in the 1970s, reform measures in India started in the 1980s,
with a move towards de-licensing and infrastructural investment accompanied by a
pro-business attitude (Bosworth and Collins, 2008 ; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2005).
India faced a serious crisis in 1991 during the rst gulf war and was at the verge
of defaulting on its domestic loans reaching a crisis point in terms of foreign exchange
reserves. India asked for a $1:8 billion bailout loan from the IMF, which in return
demanded reforms. The reforms since then, initiated by the then Finance Minister
(current Prime Minister) of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh, was a complete reversal
of the earlier era of socialistic growth. Following the East Asian model, India ini-
tiated a two-pronged reform approach: major macroeconomic management reforms
and structural and sector specic economic reforms. India started widespread priva-
tization and nancial liberalization, de-licensing the License Rajand encouraging
foreign direct investment in many major industries. Subsidies to agriculture (par-
ticularly fertilizer and food) was reduced to narrow the budget decit. Taxes were
lowered, export subsidies were abolished and import tari¤s were reduced. India initi-
ated the formation of special economic zones, with a gradual liberalizing of organized
manufacturing sector. India continues its liberalization e¤ort initiating a move to-
wards foreign direct investment in retail sector (which is still to pass muster with
all political parties) and setting up of agro-economic zones to encourage agricultural
exports.
These moves catapulted India in the last decade into the elite group of top ten na-
4The ruble fell 35% against the dollar from the onset of the crisis to January 2009, as the foreign
exchange reserves fell by $210 billion.
tions, primarily aided by a strong service sector and information technology industry.
According to Bollard, Klenow and Sharma (2012), manufacturing TFP growth in In-
dia saw substantial speedup at over 5 percentage points per year during 1993  2007
as opposed to the previous decade. While its economic transition was threatened
during the current global crisis, India weathered the 2008 crisis well, as seems to be
true of most BRIC nations. While average output growth did slow down to 7:0%
during 2008   2009, since then it has recovered to 9:0% , with a per capita GDP
growth of 7:4%5. For the rst time in decades, average annual growth rate of Indian
exports crossed the double digit mark, reaching 14:4% during the last decade, as
opposed to an average increase of 7:6% during the previous decades. The same trend
was evident in inows of foreign direct investment that totaled 1:6% of GDP during
the 2000s as compared to an average of 0:15% of GDP during the previous decade6.
5.4 China
China is one of the classical growth stories of development economics. Primarily
formed as a communist country after the 1949 revolution by its patriarch, Mao
Zedong, China yielded minimal economic power till the late 1970s and was known
as a slow growth, tightly reined communist nation. During this period, the Chinese
trade policy was focused on import substitution. The government protected the steel
and machinery industries from foreign competition by controlling imports and foreign
exchange transactions. Trade was limited to the Central Foreign Trade Ministry and
its twelve trade corporations. These trade corporations exported agricultural and
primary goods in order to nance the controlled imports of industrial equipment.
In late 1970s Deng Xiaoping introduced theGaige Kaifang (Reform and Opening-
up) policy. Since then the Government of China has pursued aggressively a pro-
reform, market-oriented growth agenda, making China one of the most successful
examples of state led capitalism today. 1978 marked the year when China started
allowing foreign direct investment into special economic zones that became con-
duits for growth while dramatically increasing the number of rms that are allowed
to engage in foreign trade. Since 1984, economic reforms picked up in earnest with
a decline in government intervention, coupled with increases in decentralization and
privatization of the state sector. Gradually through the 1980s, China started adopt-
ing an export-oriented growth model.
While the 1990s was a period of political volatility and the East Asian Crisis
that a¤ected Chinese growth to some extent, China continued on the reform process.
5As reported by the World Development Indicators, at its worst in 2008, output growth declined
to 4:9% before recovering.
6The growth in exports started in the 1990s in response to privatization and liberalization and
exports grew by almost 12% in the mid to late 1990s. However, inows of FDI did not pick up till
the 2000s.
In 1996 China accepted the IMF Article V II, that resulted in the liberalization of
foreign exchange controls related to current account transactions(de Paula 2007).
China entered a new era in December 2001 by joining the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) and agreeing to a host of globalization measures. Import quotas were
removed and tari¤s were gradually reduced. Production and exports shifted toward
labor-intensive goods while imports of consumer durables and investment goods in-
creased dramatically. Institutional changes were also apparent since the Chinese
Communist Partys meeting in 2003 that encouraged protection of property rights
and massive public investment in infrastructure development that would further en-
courage foreign investment. The liberalization policies were successful and by 2005,
domestic private sector accounted for more than 50% of Chinese GDP. The e¤orts
have borne fruit and during the rst half of the last decade, the average growth rate
of GDP has averaged roughly 10%- the highest in the world.
The Chinese government, as its BRIC counterparts, was also well equipped to
deal with the global crisis. China announced a stimulus package to the tune of RMB
4 trillion (approximately US $586 billion) that would be used for public investment.
In addition, China is turning from export dependence to home market to keep up
growth. Given Chinas success in stemming the crisis from a¤ecting its economy,
World Bank revised its estimate of Chinese growth forecast from 6:5% to 7:3% in
2010. China was successful in attaining an actual GDP growth rate of 10:4% (per
capita GDP growth rate of 9:83% - World Bank estimates). For its part, exports
still played a very important role in Chinese growth with average annual exports
growing by almost 20% during the 2000s, ably aided by an equally robust growth in
FDI inows that reached almost 4% of Chinese GDP, and was the largest amongst
the BRIC nations7.
6 Data Appendix
6.1 Sources of Macro Level Data
Output (Y )includes GDP and the imputed service ow from consumer durables.
It is decomposed into Consumption (C)that consists of household consumption of
non-durables and services (where the imputed service ow from consumer durables
are included) and Investment (X)that includes gross domestic capital formation
7Chinese dominance in terms of its export growth and ability to lure FDI preceded that of India
and in terms of timing was closer to Brazils resurgence. Both China and Brazil saw an uptick in
export growth and inows of FDI in the 1990s. It took another decade for India to follow in the
same path. As for Russia, we only have numbers for the last two decades, and it certainly seems
to be the case that the Russian resurgence also happened in the last decade, following a time-line
similar to India.
and household expenditures on consumer durables while the residual is dened as
Government Consumption (G) so that Y = C + X + G8. Labor (L) repre-
sents total hours worked which consists of total employment and hours worked per
workers. All variables are divided by the adult population9. Output, consumption
and investment are linearly detrended by the average per adult output growth rate
over the 1990  2009 period setting 1990 at the trend level10. The data is primarily
collected from the Penn World Tables edition 7:0 (and its update 7:1 published in
November, 2012) and its extension made by Duncan Foley11. Table A5 presents the
original sources of our dataset. PWT stands for Penn World Tables edition 7:0 (and
updates in version 7:1) and the extensions made by Duncan Foley. EM stands for the
Eurominotor Global Market Information Database. ILO stands for the International
Labor Organization LABORSTA database.
6.2 Constructing Data Series
6.2.1 Labor and Demographic Data
Employment E is computed from the PWT data of GDP per capita (rgdpl2) and
GDP per person counted in total employment (rgdpl2te) and population (POP ):
E =
rgdpl2
rgdpl2te
 POP:
Labor L, which is dened as total hours worked, is the product of hours worked per
worker h and employment.
The adult population N is computed using the data from ILO of the adult share
in total population and the population data from PWT:
N = adult share POP:
6.2.2 Consumption and Investment Data
Consumption expenditure Cx is dened as
Cx = Cnd + Cs +Xd;
8Therefore, G includes government purchases of goods and services as well as net exports. The
inclusion of net exports in government consumption follows the tradition of a closed economy BCA
model (Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007)).
9We use total population for China due to data availability.
10Therefore, the output series will start at the trend level in 1990 and end at the trend level in
2009.
11Source: https://sites.google.com/a/newschool.edu/duncan-foley-homepage/home/EPWT
where Cnd, Cs andXd stand for the household expenditures on non-durables, services
and durables. However, total consumption in the model C is dened as
C = Cnd + Cs + Cd;
where Cd stands for the services ow generated from durable stocks. Therefore, there
is a need to disentangle Xd from Cx and replace it with Cd.
The service ow from consumer durables Cd is imputed as
Cd = Kd(Rk + d):
where Kd is the stock of consumer durables, Rk is the net return on capital stock
and d is the depreciation rate of consumer durables assumed to be equal to 0:2.
The stock of consumer durables follows a law of motion:
Kd;t+1 = (1  d)Kd;t +Xd;t;
where the stock of consumer durables in 1990 is set equal to
Kd;1990 =
Xd;1990
d
:
In order to compute the household expenditure on durables Xd, we use the consumer
expenditure data of EM and the data of PWT for consumption share of GDP (kc),
GDP per capita (rgdpch) and population (POP ):
Xd =
consumer expenditure on durables
consumer expenditure
 kc rgdpl2 POP:
The net return on capital is dened as
Rk = f
GDP
Kf
  f ;
where Kf is net xed capital stock while f and f are the income share and depre-
ciation rate of Kf respectively. The income share f is computed following Gollin
(2002). The depreciation rate f is computed as
f =

Kf
;
where  is the consumption of net xed capital stock.
Total investment X is dened as
X = Xf +Xd
where Xf is gross domestic capital formation. Therefore, total output Y is dened
as
Y = C +X +G
= (Cx  Xd + Cd) + (Xf +Xd) +G
= GDP + Cd:
Finally, total capital stock K is dened as
K = Kd +Kf :
and the income share of total capital stock  can be computed as
 =
rK
Y
=
Yf + Cd
Y
;
where Yf is the income from net xed capital income
Yf = f GDP;
and Cd is considered as the ow income from consumer durables.
6.3 Institutional and Governance Indicators of World Bank-
Denitions and measurement details
World Bank collects data on a set of institutional and governance indicators from
212 nations and we have the time series since 1996. In each instance, measures
range from  2:5 to +2:5 with standard errors reecting variability around the point
estimate. The indicators are based on 30 aggregate data sources, survey and expert
assessments. The details can be found in:
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide
Governance Indicators : A Summary of Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues",
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130
(1) Voice and Accountability - reects perceptions of the extent to which a coun-
trys citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
(2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism - reects perceptions of
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism
(3) Government E¤ectiveness - reects perceptions of the quality of public ser-
vices, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the governments commitment to such policies
(4) Regulatory Quality - reects perceptions of the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development
(5) Rule of Law - reects perceptions of the extent to which agents have con-
dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence
(6) Control of Corruption - reects perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as
well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.
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Table A1(a). The Bayesian Estimation Priors and Posteriors for Brazil
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E. Mean Conf. Interval
Pee norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.7613 0.1059 0.7302 [0.5403, 0.9081]
Pgg norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.7836 0.0958 0.7470 [0.5905, 0.8907]
Pkk norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.6724 0.1445 0.6766 [0.4673, 0.8560]
Pll norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8148 0.0960 0.7794 [0.6201, 0.9304]
Peg norm 0 0.3 R 0.1864 0.0761 0.1765 [0.0310, 0.3193]
Pek norm 0 0.3 R -0.2272 0.1583 -0.2156 [-0.4690, 0.0646]
Pel norm 0 0.3 R -0.1784 0.1065 -0.1586 [-0.3386, 0.0247]
Pge norm 0 0.3 R -0.2360 0.1522 -0.2082 [-0.4941, 0.0923]
Pgk norm 0 0.3 R 0.1632 0.2041 0.1707 [-0.1405, 0.5264]
Pgl norm 0 0.3 R -0.1580 0.1433 -0.1448 [-0.3948, 0.1568]
Pke norm 0 0.3 R -0.0860 0.0693 -0.1071 [-0.2820, 0.0188]
Pkg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0511 0.0511 0.0495 [-0.0783, 0.1796]
Pkl norm 0 0.3 R 0.0741 0.0741 -0.0216 [-0.1568, 0.1178]
Ple norm 0 0.3 R 0.1033 0.1033 0.0047 [-0.2086, 0.1781]
Plg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0734 0.0734 0.0115 [-0.1457, 0.1734]
Plk norm 0 0.3 R 0.1489 0.1489 0.5064 [0.2718, 0.7255]
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0269 0.0039 0.0325 [0.0235, 0.0416]
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0425 0.0061 0.0483 [0.0346, 0.0613]
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0282 0.0095 0.0384 [0.0219, 0.0587]
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0131 0.0019 0.0152 [0.0119, 0.0181]
eg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0322 0.1622 -0.0142 [-0.2732, 0.2896]
ek norm 0 0.3 R 0.2104 0.1978 0.1580 [-0.1732, 0.4430]
el norm 0 0.3 R -0.1852 0.1614 -0.1623 [-0.4778, 0.0902]
gk norm 0 0.3 R -0.0033 0.2124 -0.0074 [-0.3147, 0.2969]
gl norm 0 0.3 R -0.3713 0.1645 -0.3216 [-0.5615, -0.0793]
kl norm 0 0.3 R 0.0912 0.1904 0.1090 [-0.2131, 0.4503]b beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9227 0.0465 0.9015 [0.8090, 0.9731]
!k beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9227 0.0465 0.8915 [0.8161, 0.9742]
Table A1(b). The Bayesian Estimation Priors and Posteriors for Russia
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E. Mean Conf. Interval
Pee norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8867 0.0481 0.8628 [0.7809, 0.9417]
Pgg norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.6816 0.1169 0.6777 [0.5151, 0.8821]
Pkk norm 0.8 0.2 R 1.0756 0.0337 1.0509 [0.9796, 1.1125]
Pll norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8943 0.0798 0.8093 [0.6979, 0.9316]
Peg norm 0 0.3 R 0.4713 0.1381 0.4821 [0.2421, 0.6794]
Pek norm 0 0.3 R -0.4172 0.1918 -0.4119 [-0.6786, -0.1288]
Pel norm 0 0.3 R 0.3160 0.1680 0.3267 [0.0387, 0.6241]
Pge norm 0 0.3 R -0.0613 0.0448 -0.0696 [-0.1761, 0.0257]
Pgk norm 0 0.3 R -0.0722 0.1114 -0.1128 [-0.4180, 0.1441]
Pgl norm 0 0.3 R -0.0872 0.1364 -0.0659 [-0.3882, 0.2461]
Pke norm 0 0.3 R 0.0477 0.0097 0.0565 [0.0324, 0.0797]
Pkg norm 0 0.3 R -0.0133 0.0222 -0.0196 [-0.0617, 0.0299]
Pkl norm 0 0.3 R -0.0479 0.0375 -0.0945 [-0.1996, 0.0017]
Ple norm 0 0.3 R 0.0506 0.0168 0.0528 [0.0256, 0.0829]
Plg norm 0 0.3 R -0.0869 0.0490 -0.1316 [-0.2062, -0.0398]
Plk norm 0 0.3 R -0.0429 0.0735 -0.0456 [-0.1711, 0.0770]
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0747 0.0144 0.0813 [0.0546, 0.1053]
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0921 0.0131 0.1077 [0.0748, 0.1389]
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0048 0.0013 0.0100 [0.0058, 0.0157]
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0344 0.0057 0.0411 [0.0263, 0.0529]
eg norm 0 0.3 R -0.0440 0.1691 -0.0643 [-0.3869, 0.1803]
ek norm 0 0.3 R -0.1020 0.3074 -0.0669 [-0.4770, 0.3248]
el norm 0 0.3 R -0.2907 0.1696 -0.2657 [-0.5497, 0.0173]
gk norm 0 0.3 R -0.0971 0.3177 -0.0653 [-0.5025, 0.3819]
gl norm 0 0.3 R -0.5086 0.1557 -0.4689 [-0.7077, -0.2076]
kl norm 0 0.3 R -0.1913 0.3146 -0.1562 [-0.4988, 0.2204]b beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9247 0.0452 0.8973 [0.8290, 0.9734]
!k beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9247 0.0452 0.8952 [0.8236, 0.9801]
Table A1(c). The Bayesian Estimation Priors and Posteriors for India
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E. Mean Conf. Interval
Pee norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8347 0.1087 0.7496 [0.5541, 0.9354]
Pgg norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.7579 0.0926 0.7150 [0.5335, 0.8752]
Pkk norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.9449 0.0374 0.8893 [0.8096, 0.9870]
Pll norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.7862 0.0914 0.7334 [0.5576, 0.9225]
Peg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0153 0.0404 0.0255 [-0.0360, 0.0894]
Pek norm 0 0.3 R -0.0055 0.0950 0.1106 [-0.0527, 0.2957]
Pel norm 0 0.3 R 0.1187 0.1394 0.2384 [-0.0422, 0.4973]
Pge norm 0 0.3 R 0.4071 0.2453 0.3089 [-0.1405, 0.8007]
Pgk norm 0 0.3 R 0.0139 0.2309 -0.0105 [-0.4658, 0.3294]
Pgl norm 0 0.3 R -0.0659 0.2675 -0.1229 [-0.6010, 0.3341]
Pke norm 0 0.3 R -0.0600 0.0432 -0.1103 [-0.2029, -0.0263]
Pkg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0234 0.0185 0.0484 [0.0008, 0.1052]
Pkl norm 0 0.3 R -0.3375 0.0976 -0.4529 [-0.7232, -0.2152]
Ple norm 0 0.3 R 0.0483 0.0705 0.1076 [-0.0133, 0.2309]
Plg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0356 0.0260 0.0279 [-0.0145, 0.0632]
Plk norm 0 0.3 R 0.0055 0.0620 -0.0383 [-0.1593, 0.0673]
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0444 0.0061 0.0485 [0.0360, 0.0612]
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.1470 0.0222 0.1706 [0.1264, 0.2207]
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0116 0.0033 0.0294 [0.0146, 0.0504]
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0264 0.0036 0.0274 [0.0216, 0.0327]
eg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0812 0.1537 0.0704 [-0.1952, 0.3467]
ek norm 0 0.3 R -0.1652 0.2205 -0.1809 [-0.5866, 0.2201]
el norm 0 0.3 R -0.7917 0.0802 -0.6383 [-0.8328, -0.4260]
gk norm 0 0.3 R -0.0589 0.2775 -0.0716 [-0.5309, 0.3676]
gl norm 0 0.3 R -0.1203 0.1537 -0.1522 [-0.3960, 0.1027]
kl norm 0 0.3 R -0.2428 0.2188 -0.1002 [-0.4810, 0.3016]b beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9268 0.0443 0.9003 [0.8166, 0.9740]
!k beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9268 0.0443 0.8933 [0.8007, 0.9763]
Table A1(d). The Bayesian Estimation Priors and Posteriors for China
Name Prior Posterior
Dist. Mean S.E. Support Mode S.E. Mean Conf. Interval
Pee norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8115 0.0739 0.7837 [0.6789, 0.8716]
Pgg norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8771 0.0785 0.8345 [0.6757, 0.9714]
Pkk norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.7572 0.1428 0.6638 [0.4699, 0.8355]
Pll norm 0.8 0.2 R 0.8068 0.0961 0.8267 [0.6881, 0.9619]
Peg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0573 0.0404 0.0490 [-0.0083, 0.1041]
Pek norm 0 0.3 R 0.0111 0.2527 0.1315 [-0.1517, 0.4077]
Pel norm 0 0.3 R 0.0802 0.1328 0.1743 [0.0147, 0.3611]
Pge norm 0 0.3 R 0.0018 0.1712 -0.0203 [-0.2795, 0.2926]
Pgk norm 0 0.3 R 0.2073 0.2631 0.2196 [-0.2108, 0.5496]
Pgl norm 0 0.3 R -0.1053 0.1766 -0.1348 [-0.3848, 0.1271]
Pke norm 0 0.3 R -0.0163 0.0271 -0.0024 [-0.0684, 0.0657]
Pkg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0087 0.0176 0.0383 [0.0042, 0.0719]
Pkl norm 0 0.3 R -0.1521 0.0838 -0.2014 [-0.3386, -0.1089]
Ple norm 0 0.3 R 0.0837 0.0559 0.1181 [0.0094, 0.2132]
Plg norm 0 0.3 R 0.0328 0.0281 0.0478 [-0.0016, 0.0904]
Plk norm 0 0.3 R -0.3694 0.1856 -0.2889 [-0.5038, -0.0915]
e inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0471 0.0069 0.0500 [0.0371, 0.0631]
g inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0989 0.0143 0.1059 [0.0814, 0.1345]
k inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0112 0.0045 0.0252 [0.0164, 0.0360]
l inv_g 0.01 0.1 R+ 0.0194 0.0031 0.0214 [0.0158, 0.0261]
eg norm 0 0.3 R 0.2054 0.1617 0.1414 [-0.0995, 0.3688]
ek norm 0 0.3 R -0.0340 0.2610 0.0182 [-0.3032, 0.3386]
el norm 0 0.3 R -0.1492 0.1674 -0.1569 [-0.4071, 0.0686]
gk norm 0 0.3 R 0.0524 0.2615 0.09223 [-0.2580, 0.3771]
gl norm 0 0.3 R 0.1527 0.1668 0.1607 [-0.0884, 0.4082]
kl norm 0 0.3 R -0.0633 0.2401 0.1389 [-0.1875, 0.4155]b beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9241 0.0459 0.8980 [0.8215, 0.9732]
!k beta 0.9 0.05 [0,1] 0.9241 0.0459 0.8979 [0.8340, 0.9762]
Table A2. Decomposition of Output
Benchmark model with alternative calibration
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges 0:269 1:698 0:466 0:839
Government Consumption Wedges  0:258 0:035 0:013  0:025
Investment Wedges 0:539  0:281 0:575 0:185
Labor Wedges 0:451  0:452  0:054 0:002
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:680  0:072 0:810 1:341
Government Consumption Wedges  0:128  0:537  0:033  0:081
Investment Wedges 0:851 1:193 0:185  0:173
Labor Wedges 0:959 0:416 0:039  0:086
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:108 1:646 0:400 0:105
Government Consumption Wedges  0:236 0:310  0:003 0:100
Investment Wedges 0:176  0:239 0:661 0:646
Labor Wedges  0:049  0:716  0:058 0:150
Table A3. Decomposition of Output
Benchmark model with alternative trend
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2009
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:124 0:188 0:684 0:072
Government Consumption Wedges  0:214  0:001 0:133 0:222
Investment Wedges 0:532 0:506 0:488 1:013
Labor Wedges 0:806 0:307  0:304  0:307
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:687  0:199 1:364 0:381
Government Consumption Wedges  0:147 0:267  0:557 0:051
Investment Wedges 0:735 1:202 0:841 0:905
Labor Wedges 1:099  0:270  0:649  0:336
2000:2009
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:351  0:134 0:533 0:058
Government Consumption Wedges  0:299  0:230 0:161 0:273
Investment Wedges  0:210 0:841 0:520 0:923
Labor Wedges 0:158 0:523  0:213  0:253
Table A4. Decomposition of Output
Benchmark model with alternative period
Source: Authorscalculations
1990:2007
Brazil Russia India China
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:215 1:711 0:487 0:826
Government Consumption Wedges  0:137  0:033 0:013  0:025
Investment Wedges 0:473  0:711 0:632 0:190
Labor Wedges 0:879 0:033  0:131 0:009
1990:1999
E¢ ciency Wedges  0:626  0:086 0:731 1:237
Government Consumption Wedges  0:029  0:159 0:039  0:056
Investment Wedges 0:579 1:243 0:206  0:313
Labor Wedges 1:076 0:002 0:024 0:132
2000:2007
E¢ ciency Wedges 1:221 1:603 0:432 0:303
Government Consumption Wedges  0:095 0:032  0:010 0:052
Investment Wedges  0:043  0:716 0:712 0:852
Labor Wedges  0:083 0:081  0:135  0:206
Table A5. Original Sources of the Data
GDP PWT
Consumption share PWT
Investment share PWT
Employment PWT
Hours worked per worker EM
Population PWT
Adult Share in Total Population ILO
Household Expenditure on Durables EM
Net xed Capital Stock PWT12
Depreciation PWT13
12For Russian capital stock and depreciation we refer to Izyumov and Vahaly (2008) because the
Foley database reports capital stock data only for the 2004-2008 period.
13Izyumov and Vahaly (2008) assume a constant 5% annual depreciation.
